F. Llerena, M. Núñez Oliva
Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization forvthe intersection of the kernel with the core of a coalitional game, showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his/her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he/she can receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core (Rochford, 1984). We now prove that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for optimally matched coalitions.
Palabras clave: cooperative games, assignment game, core, kernel, nucleolus
Programado
JC2 Teoría de juegos 1
19 de abril de 2012 12:00
Sala Bruselas
