Stable coalition structures for additive cost functions with critical players
In this talk, we present some special classes of cost games that satisfy k-additivity and possess players who contribute to cost reduction of all members of the alliance that they belong to (which we call critical players). This type of games can be found in knowledge-sharing games, inventory games, holding cost games, etc. While papers analyzing these games study specific examples of k-additive cost functions and analyze how players can reduce their cost through cooperation, our goal is to provide an analysis of stability for more general classes of k-additive games with critical players.
Palabras clave: stable coalition structures cost games k-additivity critical players
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