J. Alcalde Unzu, M. Gómez Rúa, E. Molis
Ni and Wang (2007, Games Econ Behav) model a river as a segment divided into n subsegments from upstream to downstream such that each agent is located in one of them. The agents generate some kind of pollution in the river. A central agency determines the costs of cleaning the river and distributes them among the agents. In this paper, we consider this model and we assume that the pollution is transmitted from upstream to downstream to a rate. When this rate is unknown we can estimate at least minimum and maximum limits of responsibility for each agent from the cost vector. We propose a new rule, the responsibility rule, which has into account the information derived from the limits of responsibility in order to distribute the cost. We also provide a characterization result of this rule with four properties: No Upstream Responsibility, Consistent Responsibility, Symmetry of the non-imputable pollution and Partial Independence of Position. We prove that the properties are independent.
Palabras clave: cCost sharing, pollutant-cleaning cost, limits of responsibility, characterization
Programado
JE2 Teoría de juegos 2
19 de abril de 2012 17:00
Sala Bruselas
